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Abstract: We propose a model describing the synergetic feedback between word-of-
mouth (WoM) and epidemic dynamics controlled by voluntary vaccination. We combine a
game-theoretic model for the spread of WoM and a compartmental model describing SIR
disease dynamics in the presence of a program of voluntary vaccination. We evaluate and
compare two scenarios, depending on what WoM disseminates: (1) vaccine advertising,
which may occur whether or not an epidemic is ongoing and (2) epidemic status, notably
disease prevalence. Understanding the synergy between the two strategies could be par-
ticularly important for organizing voluntary vaccination campaigns. We find that, in the
initial phase of an epidemic, vaccination uptake is determined more by vaccine advertising
than the epidemic status. As the epidemic progresses, epidemic status become increasingly
important for vaccination uptake, considerably accelerating vaccination uptake toward a
stable vaccination coverage.
1 Introduction
Word-of-mouth (WoM), often fueled by mass media, is a major communication channel
for spreading information on vaccines. WoM disseminates stories on vaccine scares [1],
epidemic status [2] and public health interventions [3]; its impact may go both ways.
Spread of misperceptions on the relative risks and benefits of vaccination may decrease
the vaccination coverage [4, 5], while concerns that vaccine would be in short supply may
increased compliance with vaccination programs [3].
Here we propose a new model describing the synergetic feedback between WoM and
epidemic dynamics controlled by voluntary vaccination. WoM may be an important driver
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of individual-level decisions to vaccinate. In turn, these decisions determine the level of
disease immunity in the population and the severity of the epidemic. WoM helps dissem-
inate this information which further motivates voluntary vaccination. We capture these
aspects by combining a game-theoretic model for the spread of WoM and a compartmental
model describing disease dynamics in the presence of a program of voluntary vaccination.
Previous work focused on modeling the impact of mass media for vaccination programs
[6] and WoM on spreading disease awareness and determining decisions to get vaccinated
[7, 8]. However, in general, WoM may be charged with mass media soundbites, public
health messages and information on epidemic status. The impact of WoM on determining
decisions to get vaccinated may be complex. We propose a game-theoretical framework to
address these aspects systematically. In particular, we evaluate and compare two scenarios,
depending on what WoM disseminates: (1) vaccine advertising, which may occur whether
or not an epidemic is ongoing and (2) epidemic status, notably disease prevalence. We
discuss these scenarios starting from an SIR framework. We derive several analytical
results regarding R0, vaccination uptake and stable vaccination coverage. We discuss these
results from a public health perspective.
2 Model
The model consists of two parts. One describes disease transmission and it is modeled
using a system of ordinary differential equations. The other describes the spread through
WoM (assumed to be much faster than disease transmission) and is modeled using game
theory.
2.1 Framework for Compartmental Model
We assume that the public health authority offers pre-exposure vaccination with a perfect
vaccine against a disease which is transmitted according to the principles of the SIR
model; see Fig. 1 for the flow diagram. The vaccine is always available in unrestricted
supply, whether or not there is an epidemic. Vaccination is not enforced; individuals must
request to get vaccinated (and show up for vaccination), in order to be vaccinated at no
direct cost for themselves.
We propose the following set of differential equations for the model
dS
dt
= pi − µS − βSI
N
− V, (1)
dI
dt
=
βSI
N
− (µ+ γ)I, (2)
dR
dt
= γI − µR, (3)
dV
dt
= V − µV, (4)
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Figure 1: Flow diagram of the model of disease natural history where pre-exposure vacci-
nation is offered. The boxes represent population compartments according to the disease
status: susceptible S, infectious I, recovered R, and vaccinated V . The colored arrows
represent the epidemiological processes listed in the figure legend. Demographic processes
(i.e., births and disease-unrelated deaths) are not represented in the diagram.
where N = S + I + R + V . The parameters are as follows. The symbol pi stands for the
birth rate, µ for disease-unrelated death rate, β for disease transmissibility and γ for the
recovery rate. The term V represents a function of epidemic variables and parameters, to
be determined in the next section. For further convenience, we introduce the symbol P to
denote the prevalence of infectious individuals; i.e., P ≡ I/N .
2.2 Game theoretical framework
We assume that individuals meet in pairs and discuss whether or not they got vaccinated
and the utility of vaccination. We model this social interaction using the concept of payoff,
adapted from applications of game theory to economics. By payoff we mean an empirical
score for the necessity of vaccination that interlocutors reach for themselves, as a result of
discussion. A positive score means that vaccination was necessary, while a negative score
means that vaccination would be necessary. We may also consider that payoff describes
the risk of becoming infected and benefit of vaccination. If the score is positive, then
risk is averted and the vaccination is perceived as beneficial. If the score is negative,
then risk is present: high risk corresponds to low score while low risk corresponds to high
score. Individuals meet in pairs to play a coordination game, defined by a payoff matrix
expressing how personal beliefs about vaccination are reinforced; see Table 1. We discuss
the interpretation of two payoff matrices, each describing different social phenomena.
2.2.1 Social interaction driven by vaccine advertising
We assume that vaccination benefits are advertised by the health authority in the mass
media, while no epidemiological information is accessible through public health. This
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Table 1: Structure of the payoff matrix for the coordination game of social interaction.
Various mathematical expressions functions of epidemiological parameters may be proposed
for the entries a, b, c and d.
V S
V (a, a) (b, c)
S (c, b) (d, d)
message could be conveyed even in absence of an epidemic to build herd immunity in the
population. We assume that, as a result of advertising alone, all individuals perceive the
benefits of vaccination similarly and have scores of magnitude, a′. However, if a person is
vaccinated, he considers he did well and his score is positive. If a person is susceptible, he
considers he should get vaccinated and the score is negative. Hence, the message in the
media gets into WoM. The payoff matrix, denoted byM v, is given by Eq. (5).
M v =
[
(a′, a′) (a′,−a′)
(−a′, a′) (−a′,−a′)
]
. (5)
2.2.2 Social interaction driven by epidemic status
We consider that the strength of social interaction which spreads through WoM depends
on disease prevalence; the payoff matrix, denoted byM e, is given by Eq. (6). We assume
that only vaccinated individuals are up to date with the state of the epidemic. Susceptible
individuals are oblivious of the epidemic and neither pro nor contra vaccination. When
two unvaccinated susceptible individuals discuss, they remain neutral versus vaccination
(i.e., they both get zero scores; d′′ = 0); this situation serves as reference. When two
vaccinated individuals discuss, their pro-vaccination opinions are reinforced; they both get
positive scores, which increase with disease prevalence (i.e., a′′ is a positive, increasing
function of P). When a susceptible individual discusses with a vaccinated individual,
the susceptible individual gets a negative score c′′ (where |c′′| increases with P) and the
vaccinated individual a positive score b′′, increasing with P
M e =
[
(a′′, a′′) (b′′,−|c′′|)
(−|c′′|, b′′) (0, 0)
]
. (6)
2.2.3 Score statistics and vaccination coverage dynamics
We consider that individuals mix strongly. The probability of meeting a susceptible is
pS =
S
S + V
, (7)
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and the probability of meeting a vaccinated individual is
pV =
V
S + V
. (8)
We use vaccination scores to model how individuals advise getting vaccinated. We make
three assumptions on social behavior. First, susceptible individuals look for advice for two
personal questions: “I am susceptible. Do I need to vaccinate now?” and “I am susceptible
and will vaccinate very soon. Will I regret it?”. Second, vaccinated individuals search
permanently for confirmation whether their decision to get vaccinated was good or not.
Third, an individual provides advice according to the if-I-were-you approach, disclosing
the magnitude of his current score as advice on vaccination.
After meeting sufficiently many individuals, a susceptible gathers the expected score
|c|pV + |d|pS , while a vaccinated individual gathers the expected score |a|pV + |b|pS . The
expected score gathered by an arbitrarily chosen individual as advice to get vaccinated is
(|a| + |c|)pV + (|b| + |d|)pS . Hence, out of S susceptibles who follow the overall opinion
about vaccination,
V ∝ S[(|a|+ |c|)pV + (|b|+ |d|)pS ] (9)
are expected to get vaccinated in the next unit of time. Table 2 provides formulae for the
terms V corresponding to the particular payoff matrices discussed in the previous section.
Table 2: Formulae for the vaccination terms V, given the payoff matrixM .
MatrixM Vaccination term V
M v Vv ∝ S(2a′)
M e Ve ∝ S[(a′′ + |c′′|)V + b′′S]/(V + S)
M v +M e Vve = Vv + Ve
3 Results
We present numerical and analytical results for Vve = Vv + Ve, to contrast the role of
mass media versus WoM for vaccination coverage. We introduce further rate parameters
to express Vv,e. We write Vv = ξS, just like a classic vaccination term [9]. This term is
consistent with the public health recommendation to get vaccinated even when disease is
not spreading within population.
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Assuming a′′ ∝ P, b′′ ∝ P and c′′ ∝ P, we write Ve in two alternative forms
Ve =
(
SI
N
)
ρV + σS
V + S
, (10)
Ve = S
[
P
(
ρV + σS
V + S
)]
. (11)
Equation (10) shows that Ve is positively correlated to disease incidence, while Eq. (11)
shows that Ve is positively correlated to the prevalence of infectious individuals. Figure 2
shows graphs of V (t) versus t for various values of the parameters ξ, ρ and σ.
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Figure 2: Representative graphs of V (t) versus t. The parameter values of the model
without vaccination are pi = 0.548, β = 0.2, µ = 3.6529× 10−5 and γ = 0.1. The values for
the vaccination parameters, ξ, ρ and σ, are listed in the figure legend. The unit of time is
days, so the parameter values correspond to an influenza-like epidemic.
3.1 The basic reproduction ratio R0
The disease-free equilibrium (DFE) of the model is given by
(SDFE , IDFE , RDFE , VDFE) =
(
pi
µ+ ξ
, 0, 0,
piξ
(µ+ ξ)µ
)
, (12)
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independent of ρ and σ. This equilibrium loses stability as R0, the basic reproduction
ratio, exceeds 1. Next generation analysis [10] yields the following R0 formula
R0 =
β/(1 + ξ/µ)
(µ+ ν)
. (13)
The parameters ρ and σ do not occur in Eq. (13), as a consequence of the fact that they
do not occur in Eqs. (2) and (12). However, ρ and σ occur in other key formulae of the
model (e.g., the formulae for the endemic state); see [11] for a similar discussion.
3.2 Vaccination uptake
We order the parameters ξ, ρ and σ depending on their impact on vaccination uptake (i.e.,
dV/dt) at disease invasion. Hence, we consider the model given by Eqs. (1)-(4) under the
following assumptions: N ≈ (S + I + V ) ∼ const., S ∼ const., R = 0, I/N  1, and
V/N  1. Taking partial derivatives of Eq. (4) where V = Vve we obtain
∂(dV/dt)
∂ρ
=
SIV
N(V + S)
∼ IV
N
 I, (14)
∂(dV/dt)
∂σ
=
S2I
N(V + S)
∼ I  S, (15)
∂(dV/dt)
∂ξ
= S. (16)
Hence, the parameter hierarchy for vaccination uptake at disease invasion is (in descending
order) ξ, σ and ρ.
3.3 Time-scales to reach stable vaccination coverage
The term Vv = ξS yields a fixed time scale of 1/ξ for susceptible individuals to get vacci-
nated. The term Ve yields a time scale between min{ρ, σ}I/N and max{ρ, σ}I/N , which
changes over the course of the epidemic. In particular, this time scale decreases as disease
prevalence P = I/N increases, demonstrating that WoM brings susceptible individuals
faster to get vaccinated as the epidemic gets worse.
3.4 Stable vaccination coverage
We discuss the relative role of the parameters ξ, ρ and σ for the stable level of vaccination
coverage. We solve for the endemic equilibrium of the model given by Eqs. (1)-(4) where
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V = Vve. Using star superscript for the variables at the endemic state, we write
N∗ = pi/µ, (17)
S∗ =
pi(µ+ γ)
βµ
, (18)
I∗ =
pi/µ− S∗ − V ∗
1 + γ/µ
, (19)
R∗ = γI∗/µ, (20)
0 = (V ∗ + S∗)(ξS∗ − µV ∗) + µ
β
(
pi
µ
− S∗ − V ∗
)
(ρV ∗ + σS∗). (21)
We consider the variation of Eq. (21) in V ∗, ξ, ρ and σ. The constraint between δξ, δρ
and δσ when δV ∗ = 0 yields
δξ
β
µ
=
V ∗ + S∗ − pi/µ
V ∗ + S∗
(
δρ
V ∗
S∗
+ δσ
)
. (22)
It is natural to assume that, at the endemic state, V ∗/S∗ ∼ O(1). Hence, we have that
(V ∗ + S∗ − pi/µ)/(V ∗ + S∗) ∼ O(1), as well. The coefficients of δξ, δρ and δσ could be
comparable in Eq. (22), for maintaining V ∗ unchanged. That is, changes in ξ, ρ and σ
may not follow a clear hierarchy in determining V ∗/N∗, the vaccination coverage at the
endemic state.
4 Discussion
WoM is an important communication channel that has been previously taken into ac-
count in models of sales [12] and fashion spread [13]. Following previous work on fashion
spread [13], we proposed a mixed model which combines a compartmental model for disease
transmission with a coordination game for the impact of WoM. The game analysis provided
the vaccination term for the compartmental model, depending on specific assumption on
the message and the spread of WoM. Hence, the complete model resulted as a closed system
of nonlinear ordinary differential equations amenable to standard analysis. We used our
model to discuss the relative role of WoM for vaccination advertising versus disseminating
epidemic status.
In the case where WoM disseminates vaccine advertising, we obtained that the vac-
cination term should be simply proportional to the number of susceptibles (i.e., ξ 6= 0,
ρ = 0, σ = 0). This analytic form has been previously used in compartmental models
where vaccination is described as a flow from the susceptible to the recovered class [9,14].
The flow rate parameter enters the R0 formula, demonstrating that R0 may decrease as
a result of vaccination [9, 14]. Another important result is that such a vaccination strat-
egy yields a disease-free equilibrium for the model that consists from both susceptible and
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vaccinated populations. In practice, this may cause individuals to get vaccinated even if
the community is disease-free. However, keeping the community continuously motivated
for getting vaccinated may be difficult and have prohibitive costs.
A very different scenario would be in place if we considered that WoM disseminated
the epidemic status (i.e., ξ = 0, ρ 6= 0, σ 6= 0). First, R0 would not change because of
vaccination caused by epidemic scares. Second, the disease-free equilibrium would naturally
consist only from susceptibles, as individuals would have no incentive to get vaccinated,
unless an epidemic occured.
Understanding the synergy between the two strategies could be particularly important
for organizing voluntary vaccination campaigns. We found that, in the initial phase of an
epidemic, vaccination uptake is determined more by vaccine advertising than the epidemic
status. Hence, keeping the community continuously aware of vaccine benefits and motivated
to get vaccinated may boost vaccination uptake at disease invasion. However, as the
epidemic progresses, epidemic scares become increasingly important for vaccination uptake,
considerably accelerating vaccination uptake toward a stable vaccination coverage. Finally,
the level of the stable vaccination coverage may be determined by WoM disseminating both
vaccine advertising and epidemic scares, to a comparable degree.
In a modern era of tightening resources that limit the advertising budget on commu-
nication about vaccines, it can be very useful to harness social processes to disseminate
messages of the mass media. Here, we explored conditions under which WoM could match
or exceed mass media effects, and synergistically disseminate different mass media mes-
sages.
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